Before you start banging away at your key board, trying to prove me wrong, please read my entire post first! I am talking about the GM Eastern division made FM-2 Wildcat. The one powered by the 9 cylinder Wright Cyclone engine, stripped down, with four .50 caliber machine guns, much lighter and faster. Now, we are not talking about the sheer number of planes shot down by the particular plane, we are talking kill to loss ratio. In other words, the number of planes shot down, to the number lost in air to air combat. The higher the first number, the better. F4U Corsair, 11.3-1, F6F Hellcat, 19.1-1, FM-2, 32.4-1. Now, to put this into perspective, here are the number shot down, to number lost in exact numbers. Corsair, 2,140-189, Hellcat, 5,163-270, FM-2, 422-13. There were exactly five FM-2 aces, that is all, so not as impressive as the Hellcat, with 305 pilots making ace status. On a side note, all the FM-2 pilots who became aces, did so during the Layte Gulf invasion, October 24-26, 1944. This was during the famous Taffy 3 fight. The P-51 Mustang had a 19-1 ratio.
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Wildcat, Best US Navy Fighter WWII
- Thread starter Stearmen
- Start date
Mr.Astor
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Who are you barking at!!! Banging away on the keyboard??? Puzzling?
Metatron
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Remarkable ratio for such a humble aircraft. But then there are factors such as handling, visibility and pilot training.
Are the Mustang numbers just for PTO or ETO as well?
Are the Mustang numbers just for PTO or ETO as well?
I think overall, but may just be for the ETO.
Not at you!
Mr.Astor
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Thanks! No offense taken.
Worf
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Boy those "stats" might not raise much of a ruckus here... BUT had you posted them in the IL2 Forums... say after the "Pacific Fighters" game had launched... they'd have skinned you alive. Those are very interesting stats. The Wildcat was widlely considered obsolete at the war's start. I'm surprised it did as well as it did BUT you're only talking about one variant of the plane not all the planes badged as Wildcats. but the only Air War stat that makes me shake my head is the one which states that more Airmen were lost over Europe than Marines in the Pacific. That just blows my mind!
Worf
Worf
I like all WWII aircraft (even the P-39) so I have nothing against the Wildcat, and a lot for it, but that sort of statistic doesn't take enough factors into account. These numbers compare first-line fighters against what became mostly a second-line ground support aircraft in the latter half of the war. It could be that the Wildcat's good numbers were as much attributable to the fact that they weren't being opposed as much, and the people opposing them weren't as good as for the other aircraft.
(Agree with Worf about the Air Corps vs. Marines statistic. Amazing!)
(Agree with Worf about the Air Corps vs. Marines statistic. Amazing!)
Captain Nemo
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I would tend to agree with the others that the pilots mattered just as well as the equipment that they flew. The US could not only harness its industrial capacity to build advanced aircraft in large numbers, they also could mobilize and train people to fly them to high standards.
I don't have exact references in front of me, so I shall rely on the internet proof that I can find. I found a couple of places that address the topic, but they are wikipedia and a random internet forum, so take them with a grain of salt as you will.
First, from wiki:
"The Japanese pilot training program was very selective and rigorous, producing a high-quality and long-serving pilot corps, who ruled the air in the Pacific during early World War II. However, the long duration of the training program, combined with a shortage of gasoline for training, did not allow the Navy to rapidly provide qualified replacements in sufficient numbers. Moreover, the Japanese, unlike the U.S. or Britain, proved incapable of altering the program to speed up training of the recruits they got. The resultant decrease in quantity and quality, among other factors, resulted in increasing casualties toward the end of the war."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_Air_Service
From poster R Leonard on ww2aircraft forums:
"What was the final devastating factor for IJN aviation, both carrier and land based was their inability to make good their losses. While some like to believe that the cream of the IJN carrier aviators were wiped out at Midway, that is not exactly true. The loss of the four carriers in this battle meant that, no matter what, all of their aircraft were lost. So, probably about 256 planes were lost. This does not equate to the loss of 256 pilots; rather, the Japanese only lost somewhat less than100 pilots in the battle, most of whom met their ends aboard sinking carriers as opposed to air combat operations. Where the curve of the loss of experienced pilots started to drop off the chart was in the Solomons where both land based pilots and, thrown in as reinforcements, carrier pilot losses, went beyond the IJN’s training programs ability to replace them with a quality product. The short hiatus from the Solomons campaigns to the Mariana’s allowed the IJN some training and preparation respite, but it really was never enough to build air groups of the pre-war caliber. A substantial majority of these newly trained pilots, along with many of the residual experienced leaders, were lost in the Battle of the Philippines Sea, or as it is known, “The Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot.” Somewhere (grabbing numbers out of the air because I don’t feel like looking it up) around 325 IJN planes and their crews were shot down, with no hope of rescue for any who might have been able to survive their downing. Essentially, this action eliminated the second generation of IJN carrier pilots and was a blow from which the IJN never recovered.
As near as I can put together, during the course of the war the IJN trained some 24,000 pilots of all stripes. Roughly 18,900 of them, and their pre-war compatriots, were killed, either in action, training, or operationally. Over 2500 of these were killed in suicide attacks.....
In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. Thus in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. And each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced, and, for the carrier pilots combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type.
This was a level of training and preparation with which the IJN could never dream of competing. The IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. There two most critically lacking areas were a continued adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every one graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students’ skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Most of them arrived in combat squadrons with less than 200 hours in all, by the very end of the war, less than 100 hours. Most had to learn combat skills on the job once assigned to a combat squadron. By then, it is too late and few survived."
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/wwii-naval-pilot-training-426.html
I don't have exact references in front of me, so I shall rely on the internet proof that I can find. I found a couple of places that address the topic, but they are wikipedia and a random internet forum, so take them with a grain of salt as you will.
First, from wiki:
"The Japanese pilot training program was very selective and rigorous, producing a high-quality and long-serving pilot corps, who ruled the air in the Pacific during early World War II. However, the long duration of the training program, combined with a shortage of gasoline for training, did not allow the Navy to rapidly provide qualified replacements in sufficient numbers. Moreover, the Japanese, unlike the U.S. or Britain, proved incapable of altering the program to speed up training of the recruits they got. The resultant decrease in quantity and quality, among other factors, resulted in increasing casualties toward the end of the war."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_Air_Service
From poster R Leonard on ww2aircraft forums:
"What was the final devastating factor for IJN aviation, both carrier and land based was their inability to make good their losses. While some like to believe that the cream of the IJN carrier aviators were wiped out at Midway, that is not exactly true. The loss of the four carriers in this battle meant that, no matter what, all of their aircraft were lost. So, probably about 256 planes were lost. This does not equate to the loss of 256 pilots; rather, the Japanese only lost somewhat less than100 pilots in the battle, most of whom met their ends aboard sinking carriers as opposed to air combat operations. Where the curve of the loss of experienced pilots started to drop off the chart was in the Solomons where both land based pilots and, thrown in as reinforcements, carrier pilot losses, went beyond the IJN’s training programs ability to replace them with a quality product. The short hiatus from the Solomons campaigns to the Mariana’s allowed the IJN some training and preparation respite, but it really was never enough to build air groups of the pre-war caliber. A substantial majority of these newly trained pilots, along with many of the residual experienced leaders, were lost in the Battle of the Philippines Sea, or as it is known, “The Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot.” Somewhere (grabbing numbers out of the air because I don’t feel like looking it up) around 325 IJN planes and their crews were shot down, with no hope of rescue for any who might have been able to survive their downing. Essentially, this action eliminated the second generation of IJN carrier pilots and was a blow from which the IJN never recovered.
As near as I can put together, during the course of the war the IJN trained some 24,000 pilots of all stripes. Roughly 18,900 of them, and their pre-war compatriots, were killed, either in action, training, or operationally. Over 2500 of these were killed in suicide attacks.....
In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. Thus in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. And each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced, and, for the carrier pilots combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type.
This was a level of training and preparation with which the IJN could never dream of competing. The IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. There two most critically lacking areas were a continued adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every one graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students’ skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Most of them arrived in combat squadrons with less than 200 hours in all, by the very end of the war, less than 100 hours. Most had to learn combat skills on the job once assigned to a combat squadron. By then, it is too late and few survived."
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/wwii-naval-pilot-training-426.html
Should we ignore the kills obtained by Japanese pilots during 1941 to early 42, because they were better then the allies? The same goes for German pilots in 39 into 40! Does this mean, Richard Bong was not a great Ace? Most of his 40 kills came after January 1944.
cw3pa
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"but the only Air War stat that makes me shake my head is the one which states that more Airmen were lost over Europe than Marines in the Pacific. That just blows my mind! "
Remember that each heavy bomber that went down carried at least 10 men with it, and some raids had catastophic casualties.
Remember that each heavy bomber that went down carried at least 10 men with it, and some raids had catastophic casualties.
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The worst part of that statistic is, it was only the 8th Air Force Bomber Command that incurred that many casualties! Then there were the losses of the rest of the 8th, 9th and the 15th flying out of North Africa and Italy.
Captain Nemo
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Aerial victories are aerial victories. I do not believe there is a list anywhere that tells which particular pilots were shot down by whom. Major Bong could have had his victories over tyros on mission #1, or over the most experienced pilots the Japanese had left. I don't think we'll ever really know.
All I am saying is that though having good technology in the fighter planes your pilots are using, there are other factors involved in aerial victory ratios. Certainly the training and experience levels of your pilots are important in that, as are the training and experience levels of the opponent. Flying hour currencies could be a factor- certainly a pilot whose military can afford to buy lots of avgas for flight time would have an advantage over the pilot whose government is so resource-limited that he only takes off in the most dire of situations. Supply and maintenance are factors- certainly the pilots whose military has the spare parts and qualified maintainers would have an advantage over the pilot whose government could not provide those things.
I just thought of something. If we go by your logic, then most of the kills by Hellcat and Corsair pilots racked up at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot should be ignored, since those were mostly inexperienced, or over worked pilots.
Some of you might like this. As far as I know, it is the only restored Wildcat, to use the original starting procedure. Does any one know if any of the current Spitfires are using this starting method? [video=youtube;65qrzgbTTcQ]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65qrzgbTTcQ[/video]
Otter
One Too Many
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Is that Avgas puddling under the engine?
Yes!!!
Otter
One Too Many
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Not an expert on this, is it a cyclone or twin wasp in there? Surely that cannot be normal starting procedure did they flood it? I can just imagine what might happen on a carrier deck or worse, a carrier hanger if you started it like that. Holy Conflagration Batman!
Treetopflyer
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That is AWESOME! My only experience is with jet engines, but I would guess that they would have to prime the engine since it is its first start after rebuild. The gas would be overflow from the priming.
It's a Wright 9 cylinder Cyclone. The primer might be stuck on, or a float. I am sure it works fine now. If you look at the old photos and footage from WWII, they never started one of the round engines with out one man on the fire extinguisher!
