france

[MrBern]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7942086.stm

Former UK Prime Minister Macmillan on French Neurosis:

France, he said, had made peace with Germany, had forgiven Germany for the brutality of invasion and the humiliation of four years of occupation, but it could never - never - forgive the British and Americans for the liberation.

The historian Andrew Roberts has calculated that of the 4,572 allied servicemen who died on that day(D-Day) on which, in retrospect, so much of human history seems now to have pivoted - only 19 were French. That is 0.4%.

Of the rest, 37 were Norwegians, and one was Belgian. The rest were from the English speaking world - two New Zealanders, 13 Australians, 359 Canadians, 1,641 Britons and, most decisively of all, 2,500 Americans.

 

[Marc Chevalier]

The ordinary Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of the time --those who lived under the Occupation-- were as grateful to America as they were disgusted with the incompetence and corruption of France's 1930s governments, the absurd Maginot Line, and Vichy. One of those ordinary Frenchmen was my grandfather, who volunteered to work for the American army as an English/French/German interpreter as soon as the Yanks arrived in his Normandy village. He loved his American comrades and spoke admiringly of "the American spirit" for the rest of his life. Eventually, his only daughter --my mother-- married an American.

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[Spitfire]

We are not going down that road again, are we?

 

[Marc Chevalier]

We are not going down that road again, are we?

Perhaps MrBern wants to earn his very own thread closure? lol


Seriously, this one probably should be closed. It's a case of threaded there, posted that, so why :deadhorse ?

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[Tomasso]

My father spent several years rebuilding the rail yards in Europe. He said that he was stunned at how poorly he was treated in Paris; While in Berlin, they kissed his feet.

 

[BellyTank]

Not even

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B
T

 

[Pip]

Not quite sure how he came to the conclusion, the Free French element of No4 Commando lost a fair few on 6th June (can't remember the exact figure), when coupled with the losses from 2eme RCP (4th SAS - French Battalion) the figures are well over 19 already. Those 2 units are by no means the only ones involved on the 6th June '44 either!

Just goes to show that every historian can do more research than he deems necessary

 

[dhermann1]

To get a good understanding of the complex dynamics between the French and their Allies, read "Churchill and DeGaulle", by Francois Kersaudy.
The Maginot Line worked perfectly, actually. The Germans never went near it. But the section near the Belgian border, not technically part of the Maginot Line, where the Germans actually did attack, was poorly designed and underbuilt. The French made the mistake of assuming the Germans would not violate Belgian neutrality.
When the French were in a position to fight they fought well. They fought their hearts out at Cassino, as I recall.
The main reason so few French were involved in D-Day was security. Because of the rampant factionalism among the Free French committee, Eisenhower knew he couldn't let DeGaulle know of the invasion until barely 48 hours before it was launched. If the French had been informed, somebody would surely have spilled the beans.
The political disunity of France was its downfall. But when the French were properly led, they fought as hard as anyone during the war.
If you want to delve into the mind of Charles DeGaulle, however, you can find plenty to debate. But let's not.

 

[Marc Chevalier]

The Maginot Line worked perfectly, actually.

Well, yes ... in the sense that "the operation was a success, though the patient died." Putting all of France's eggs into one Maginot basket was indeed absurd.

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[Chas]

I disagree with the assertion that the French fought as hard as anyone else. Perhaps they did in isolated cases, but not as a general rule. The French Army, from the general staff on down, was overly politicized, apathetic and quite content to sit behind the Maginot line. In May of 1940, with the exception of a few formations (De Gaulle's DCR and some Algerians) they put up a very poor show of defense of their country. Dismally led, disorganized and defeatist. They had all the aggressive spirit sucked out of them by the memory of WWI and the building of that ridiculous (and unbelievably expensive) line. They could have beaten the Germans royally in the fall/winter of '39 as all the German armor was busy beating up on Poland, and were under orders to withdraw if the French crossed the Rhine bridges. Hitler guessed right that they wouldn't attack, and would prefer to sit behind the Maginot line. They moved about 5 km into Germany, and then scuttled back behind their fortifications.

I recall that during Torch the French shot at the Brits quite enthusiastically, and killed quite a few as they wanted revenge for what happened at Oran. The Americans, on the other hand, they would do a deal with, and began switching sides when Americans were doing the negotiating.

In retrospect, the Allies should have kept Torch an all-American show, as far as they could manage, anyway.

Or, the French could have done what they should have done in the first place. Sail their fleet to the UK to keep it out of German hands. They really did force the Brit's hand.

 

[Pip]

The key phrase used is "retrospect", hindsight is a valuable thing for the historian, however in reality it isn't all that useful.

To address the problems presented one must truly look past hindsight, not what they "could have thought" but what they did actually think/access the mindset of the troops and the psychology of them. Also we must look at the practicalities of the other options available at the time, and their consquences.

 

[Chas]

Yes, and I'm sure that if you researched it I am betting that you would find serious misgivings about the capabilities of the French Army by British officers and the better French ones. I'm referring to private correspondences and notes kept during conferences, etc. That, on the other hand, is historically useful.

 

[Pip]

Yes, and I'm sure that if you researched it I am betting that you would find serious misgivings about the capabilities of the French Army by British officers and the better French ones. I'm referring to private correspondences and notes kept during conferences, etc. That, on the other hand, is historically useful.

Absolutely, my prime interest lies within FAFL, the French Air Force who were even more guilty than the army of the various accusations of "not trying" early on in 1940, the ideas drawn from pilots serving alongside them (Poles, Czechs and British/Commonwealth) testify this quite eloquently alongside conversations I've had the pleasure of having with Free-French Pilots,and how this then created the fighting ideals of the post-Dunkirk French force, quite the opposite to that of the French airforce of 1940. I try to avoid false pretenses so do agree with many things you in fact say.

The accounts made by the "better French officers" are often enlightening, beautifully highlighting the ridiculous political structure and the command structure as a whole and how ineffective/bumbling it was. It's quite surprising when reading some accounts, to learn that some of the worlds best officers were placed within the French army, starved of their independence and having their common sense/military genius crushed by the command.

I do however believe that there are far too many myths surrounding the 1940 campaign within France, myths which are generally terribly scathing of the French effort in comparison to the British effort, myths which are often not deserved and need to be expunged from many so called "history books". It's nice to find somebody who has taken an interest beyond the commonly accept views however.


Although I feel that we may have divulged from the original point of the topic, the Free-French forces involvement in the liberation of France rather than those of 1940-42 lol

 

[Chasseur]

A great deal of the "decadent, defeatist France" narrative of history (popularized by William Shirer and JB Duroselle) has been challenged by some excellent work by diplomatic and military historians in the past 20 years or so.

Julien Jackson, "The Fall of France" is a great survey of this work.

Martin Alexander, "The Republic in Danger," a revisionist look at Gamelin.

Robert Doughty, "Seeds of Disaster," on WWII and "Pyrrhic Victory" on WWI has done excellent work giving a much more balanced view of French military doctrine, strategy and operations in the World Wars. Note: Doughty is a retired US Army Brigadier General and the former head of the Department of History at West Point.

Eugenia Kielsing, "Arming Against Hitler," another West Point history professor.

Robert Young, "In Command of France."

For more on the large number of French and French colonial troops that fought in the liberation of France, Douglas Porch, “The Path to Victory”, and Anthony Clayton’s “France, Soldiers and Africa” are good. By the winter of 1944-45 the French had some 10 divisions (two armies, between 500,000-1,000,000 men) fighting the Germans (the US and the UK played a critical role in supplying and equipping them of course).

Also the "invincibility" of the German army and the whole concept of "Blitzkreig" has been questioned by some other excellent historians, see Freiser's (German military officer and historian)"The Blitzkreig Legend", and also work done by Russell Hart, "Clash of Arms" and "Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?"

 

[dhermann1]

Great thread! Great discussion. My knowledge of WW II is fairly wide, but still pretty sketchy and shallow in many areas. Great to hear from people with more in depth information.

 

[TM]

The Maginot Line was very well designed and engineered. Each individual fortification was in gun range of the fortifications to each side. So if one was at risk of being overrun, the neighboring forts could fire on the endangered fort, driving off the attackers. The sturdy construction of the forts would leave them untouched. The forts functioned well, except for some air supply problems which did cause some asphyxiation, so they were not perfectly designed.

However, what is forgotten is that the Maginot Line was conceived as a two-part system. The first is, of course, the fortifications. The second was a highly mobile force behind the Line. This force could react to probing invaders and support and counterattact anywhere along the Line. But, the Line cost so much to build that the mobile force was not funded.

Anyway, the fortifications seemed to have worked as a deterrent, as the Germans avoided a direct confrontation and instead moved around the Line through Belgium.

Tony

 

[MrBern]

Dday breakfast

I liked the line in one of Ambrose's books that had a French farmer yelling disgustedly at American paratroops who had eaten much of his Strawberry field for breakfast, whereas the Germans had never eaten any during the occupation....

 

[MrBern]

Perhaps MrBern wants to earn his very own thread closure? lol


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Locked threads? Ive been there....
This thread was started after reading a good news article regarding "Sarkozy the American".